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I. INTRODUCTION
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1324 makes it a crime to transport or smuggle
aliens into the United States or to harbor them there.' Transport-
ing is a crime that, by its nature, always has witnesses-the aliens
who seek admittance to, or safe harbor in, the United States. Like
the persons who provide them assistance, these witnesses are guilty
of a crime-illegal entry into the United States.2 But, unlike the
person accused of transporting them, the witnesses do not always
face prosecution. If they are committing their first offense, they
may, under the law, opt to be immediately returned to their native
countries.
Often, however, that option is not available until the Govern-
ment has had the opportunity to interview the seized alien wit-
nesses to determine which, if any, member of the group can be
prosecuted as a transporter or smuggler under § 1324. 4 As a result
of those interviews, the Government will often identify someone it
believes to have been the leader and one or several aliens who can
provide testimony that will assist the Government in prosecuting
the alleged leader.' The Government will then detain those wit-
nesses and return the rest of the aliens to their countries.6
The fate of the detained witnesses has been the subject of much
litigation. Although the Government has the authority to keep the
witnesses in custody until the defendant's trial-and has done
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2002).
2. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2002) (establishing a criminal offense for illegal entry by an
alien).
3. Border Patrol agents may make warrantless arrests of aliens suspected of a first-
time illegal entry, and these aliens may be granted immediate voluntary departure from the
country. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2000); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858,
864 (1982); 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2002); see also Robert J. McWhirter & Jon M. Sands, A
Primer for Defending a Criminal Immigration Case, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 23, 24 (1994)
(noting that the majority of first-time illegal entries are not prosecuted).
4. See Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 861 (describing the specific procedure followed
by investigators).
5. See Lisa Chanow Dykstra, Note, The Application of Material Witness Provisions: A
Case Study-Are Homeless Material Witnesses Entitled to Due Process and Representation
by Counsel?, 36 VILL. L. REv. 597, 619 n.105 (1991) (noting that use of smuggled aliens as
witnesses is not an uncommon practice).
6. See Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U S. at 861 (describing the incident in which one of the
three passengers was selectively detained as a witness).
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so7 -such prolonged detentions have been successfully challenged
by alien witnesses who have relied on provisions that require the
Government, at the witnesses' request, to depose and release
them.8 Releasing the witnesses, however, raises new problems.
Once released, the witnesses are often returned to their countries,
beyond the subpoena power of U.S. courts. 9 If the witnesses do
not return to testify at the defendant's trial, the right to confront
adverse witnesses, secured by the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, is implicated.' °
Whether, and under what conditions, the absent witnesses' hear-
say deposition testimony is admissible in a § 1324 defendant's trial
is the issue discussed in this Article. Some defendants have
claimed that, even if a witness has been deported, the use of the
witness's deposition testimony violates the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses.'I The courts have
been divided in their response to these claims. Some have agreed
7. See id. (noting that the Government detained an illegal alien witness "to provide a
nonhearsay basis for establishing that" a defendant had violated 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2));
Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 412 (5th Cir. 1992) (describing Government's practice
of detaining witnesses); United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1971)
(describing the Government practice of interviewing alien witnesses and returning them to
their country of origin), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,
458 U.S. 858 (1982); see also Torres-Ruiz v. United States Dist. Court, 120 F.3d 933, 934
(9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (deciding a case in which witnesses had been incarcerated
pending trial); United States v. Lin, 143 F. Supp. 2d 783, 784-85 (E.D. Ky. 2001) (noting
that in an unlawful employment of aliens case, the Government deported some witnesses
and detained others); United States v. Huang, 827 F. Supp. 945, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (ob-
serving that detained witnesses were deposed and released).
8. See Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 412 (describing a successful district court challenge);
United States v. Rivera, 859 F.2d 1204, 1207-08 (4th Cir. 1988) (upholding a challenge to
detention).
9. See United States v. Aguilar-Tamayo, 300 F.3d 562, 564 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that
after being deposed, witnesses returned to Mexico); Rivera, 859 F.2d at 1206 (describing
witnesses' election to return voluntarily to Mexico after depositions were completed).
10. See Huang, 827 F. Supp. at 948 (stating that use of deposition testimony often
conflicts with the Sixth Amendment).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Allie, 978 F.2d 1401, 1406 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting defen-
dant's argument that use of deposition testimony as evidence, violated the Confrontation
Clause); United States v. Lopez-Cervantes, 918 F.2d 111, 114 (10th Cir. 1990) (referring to
procedures to be used in order to avoid violation of the Sixth Amendment in such cases);
United States v. Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d 266, 269 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating defendant's
claim that Government did not establish a good faith effort to have witnesses present at
trial); Huang, 827 F. Supp. at 946 (granting defendant's motion for a conditioned release of
witnesses on the ground that deportation would lead to violation of the Sixth Amendment
right).
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that the Government is required to at least attempt to bring the
witness to trial; others have held that any attempt, in light of the
witness's deportation, would be futile.12
In 1996, Congress attempted to address the issue. It added Sub-
section (d) to 8 U.S.C. § 1324, providing in prosecutions brought
under the statute that the videotaped depositions of alien material
witnesses are admissible at trial "[n]otwithstanding any provision
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.' 1 3 But Congress's explicit at-
tempt to circumvent the evidentiary hearsay rule has done little to
clarify matters. Both the federal evidentiary rules and the United
States Constitution require the Government to make reasonable
efforts to present a witness's live testimony at trial before the wit-
ness's prior testimony is admissible.' 4 The requirements are not
coextensive, however, and no matter what effect Congress in-
tended to have on the evidentiary rules, it cannot relieve the Gov-
ernment of duties imposed by the Constitution.' 5 For that reason,
the courts addressing the constitutionality of the provision have re-
fused to hold that Congress intended to absolve the Government
of its constitutional obligation to make efforts to present live testi-
mony.16 Instead, they have held, with no explanation, that the con-
stitutional requirement remains intact.' 7  Thus construed, the
provision adds little, if anything, to the law in existence at the time
of its passage.
This Article argues that because of the obligations placed on the
Government by the Confrontation Clause, § 1324(d) cannot, by it-
12. Compare United States v. Martinez-Perez, 916 F.2d 1020, 1021-22 (5th Cir. 1990)
(holding that before depositions are admitted, Government must show unavailability), with
United States v. Terrazas-Montano, 747 F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 1984) (concluding that a
deported witness is unavailable).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(d) (2002).
14. See FED. R. EvID. 804(a)(5), (b)(1) (requiring the finding of unavailability before
prior deposition testimony is admissible); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980) (pointing
to the Sixth Amendment requirement for a finding of unavailability).
15. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (stating that Con-
gress cannot authorize a constitutional violation).
16. See United States v. Aguilar-Tamayo, 300 F.3d 562, 562 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding
that the statute admitting a videotaped deposition did not violate the Confrontation
Clause); United States v. Santos-Pinon, 146 F.3d 734, 734 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming the
lower court's holding that admission of videotaped testimony was not unconstitutional).
17. See Aguilar-Tamayo, 300 F.3d at 565 (requiring the Government to establish the
unavailability of a witness before deposition testimony can be admitted); Santos-Pinon, 146
F.3d at 736 (noting the Government must establish unavailability).
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self, resolve the tension between an alien defendant's right to con-
frontation and the need to address both the logistical and human
rights implications of detaining material witnesses. First, the Arti-
cle discusses the current state of Confrontation Clause law and its
relationship to the rules of evidence, demonstrating that the two
remain distinct, at least insofar as prior judicial testimony is con-
cerned. Next, the Article discusses the problem Congress sought
to address in passing § 1324(d)-the unnecessary and burdensome
detention of alien material witnesses-and whether Congress ef-
fectively addressed that problem. Finally, the Article proposes that
any real solution must begin with a judicial clarification of the con-
frontation right in § 1324 cases. Such clarification, and any legisla-
tion based on it, should not authorize a wholesale abandonment of
the right, but it should instead accommodate both the significant
interests of alien defendants in confronting witnesses brought to
testify against them and the interests of those witnesses in avoiding
unnecessarily prolonged detentions.
II. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE, THE HEARSAY RULE,
AND PRIOR TESTIMONY
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause requires that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...
to be confronted with the witnesses against him. s18 This clause, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, protects many of the same in-
terests as the rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay evidence. 19
Like the hearsay rule, for example, the clause secures the right to
cross-examine adverse witnesses, thus promoting the reliability of
factfinding.2 ° The Court has stated that the Confrontation Clause
envisions:
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353 (1992) (recognizing that hearsay rules and
the Confrontation Clause protect similar values); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (noting overlap
between the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86
(1970) (stating the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules "stem from the same roots");
John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination,
and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 199 (1999) (noting that
hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause protect similar interests).
20. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123-24 (1999) (stating the interest protected by
the Confrontation Clause is reliability); Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1996)
(commenting that hearsay rules exist to ensure that evidence is sufficiently reliable); see
also Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (echoing that cross-examination promotes
2003]
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[A] personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in
which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recol-
lection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling
him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at
him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.2 1
The Court has gone even further, stating not only that a jury must
be able to assess for itself whether a witness is lying, but also sug-
gesting that a witness will be less likely to lie if he gives his testi-
mony in person, in front of a defendant. 2
Both the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule are subject
to exceptions. Many kinds of out-of-court statements are admissi-
ble at trial, either because they are deemed not be hearsay or be-
cause they are excepted from the hearsay rule.23 Some of the
exceptions are designed to ensure that trials are conducted effi-
ciently and that relevant evidence is not unfairly excluded; others
respond to various public policy concerns.24 The same kinds of
concerns have prompted courts to carve out exceptions to the Con-
frontation Clause even though the clause, on its face, tolerates no
reliability); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (recognizing the importance of cross-examination); Cal-
ifornia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) (requiring witness's presence at trial); Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (holding that failure to cross-examine a witness does not
violate the Confrontation Clause); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (com-
menting that cross examination may satisfy the Confrontation Clause); 2 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 244 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (relying on general evidentiary princi-
ples); Joshua C. Dickinson, The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule: The Current
State of a Failed Marriage in Need of a Quick Divorce, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 763, 816
(2000) (stating that the purpose of hearsay rule is to ensure that evidence is reliable);
Gordon Van Kessel, Hearsay Hazards in the American Criminal Trial: An Adversary-Ori-
ented Approach, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 501 (1998) (announcing that the purpose of hearsay
rules is to ensure right of cross examination).
21. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
22. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-20 (1988) (implying that the Confrontation
Clause promotes truthfulness).
23. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62 (stating that the hearsay rule is "riddled with excep-
tions"); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (noting that
not all hearsay is unreliable and inadmissible).
24. See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804(b) (setting out exceptions and exclusions from Federal
Rules of Evidence); James A. George, Hearsay: Recognizing It and Handling the Objec-
tion, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 489, 489-90 (1986) (stating hearsay exceptions developed in
part because of recognition that some hearsay is reliable, or bears value because of its
hearsay nature, and in part for practical considerations).
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exceptions. The Supreme Court, early in its Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence, rejected a literal interpretation of the
Clause.26 An accepted hearsay exception, however, does not auto-
matically satisfy the Confrontation Clause, and the Court has
maintained that the hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause
are not always coextensive.27 For that reason, the Court tests both
traditional and newly crafted hearsay exceptions against the re-
quirements of the Confrontation Clause.28 In many cases, it has
found no constitutional problem with the challenged hearsay ex-
ception. It has held, for example, that dying declarations, a tradi-
tional exception to the hearsay rule under the common law, are
admissible, even over a Confrontation Clause challenge.29 It has
also held that coconspirator statements,30 prior inconsistent state-
ments,31 and the statements of child sex-abuse victims survive the
Confrontation Clause.32
But not all hearsay exceptions escape a constitutional chal-
lenge.33 As the Court has recognized, the personal right to con-
front adverse witnesses in a criminal trial goes beyond mere
25. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (observing that read literally, the Confrontation Clause
would always require exclusion of hearsay). But see Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243 (concluding
that the Confrontation Clause should not be read literally).
,26. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243 (stating that the Confrontation Clause does not re-
quire exclusion of all statements made outside of trial); see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62-63
(rejecting the literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause).
27. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990) (noting that the Court has been
careful not to equate the hearsay prohibition with the Confrontation Clause); United
States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988) (noting "partial" overlap); California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970) (noting that while the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rule
protect similar interests, they are not identical).
28. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392 (1986) (commenting on the validity of
hearsay exceptions); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (recognizing the competing interests of the two
articles); Green, 399 U.S. at 162 (noting the judicial scrutiny of the Confrontation Clause).
29. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243 (reiterating the dying declaration exception to
hearsay).
30. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 400.
31. Green, 399 U.S. at 164.
32. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990).
33. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 812, 827 (1990) (holding that the child's state-
ments made to a doctor and admitted into court under Idaho's residual hearsay exception
violated the Confrontation Clause); Green, 399 U.S. at 155-56 (concluding the fact that the
hearsay exception allows particular testimony as evidence, does not necessarily mean that
the Confrontation Clause would allow it into the record); see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012, 1021 (1988) (examining the asserted exception for testimony of child sex-abuse vic-
tim and concluding that the State may not shield the child from confrontation with accused
based only on generalized allegations of trauma); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 723 (1968)
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concerns of reliability to fundamental and deeply rooted notions of
fairness. 34 Even though the Court acknowledges this distinction
between the constitutional requirement and the evidentiary rule, a
consistent framework for distinguishing permissible exceptions
from impermissible exceptions has so far eluded the Court.35
In attempting to articulate such a framework, the justices have
debated the intended scope of the constitutional protection. The
Court has argued, for example, over the importance of an actual
face-to-face confrontation, 36 has questioned whether confrontation
must be available for all hearsay testimony,37 and has disputed the
role of public policy concerns in the analysis.38 The long-standing
(examining the asserted exception for prior testimony and holding that before such testi-
mony can be admitted, the Government must show the witness is unavailable).
34. See Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017 (stating that confrontation right protects "something
deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and ac-
cuser" as basic to fair trial); Lee v, Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (stating that the clause
contributes to the "establishment of a system of criminal justice in which the perception as
well as the reality of fairness prevails"); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (holding
that the right to confront adverse witnesses is basic to a fair trial); see also John G.
Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1797, 1810 (2001)
(noting the distinction between the hearsay rule's emphasis on reliability, admissibility, and
the procedural protection afforded by the Confrontation Clause of face-to-face confronta-
tion); Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-in Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1171, 1239 (2002) (stating that unlike the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause primarily
protects the right to face-to-face confrontation).
35. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980) (noting that the Court has not
developed a theory that resolves questions regarding all hearsay exceptions); Green, 399
U.S. at 162 (stating there is no theory under which to evaluate all challenged exceptions);
see also Tom Patton, Comment, Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause-Is a Showing of
Unavailability Required?, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 573, 573 (1993) (noting that the Court has
"struggled" to define what hearsay does, and what hearsay does not, violate the Confronta-
tion Clause).
36. Compare Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017 (announcing that the literal right to confront wit-
nesses is at the core of the Confrontation Clause), with id. at 1031 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (contending the fact that the defendant could not see the child witness who testified
behind screen was a minimal violation and was justified by public policy).
37. Compare White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (ar-
guing for an absolute right to confront witnesses who testify against the defendant), and
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 863 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Sixth
Amendment explicitly provides for face-to-face confrontation), with id. at 849 (holding
that face-to-face confrontation is merely "preference," even for witnesses who appear at
trial).
38. Compare Craig, 497 U.S. at 860-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority
for allowing policy concerns to override Confrontation Clause protections), with id. at 849
(concluding that in some cases, the right to confrontation must yield to policy
considerations).
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and complex debate has resulted in a jurisprudence that is anything
but coherent.39
There have, however, been moments of clarity. One such mo-
ment came in Ohio v. Roberts,4 0 perhaps the Court's clearest artic-
ulation of the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and
the hearsay rule.41 In Roberts, the State of Ohio sought to intro-
duce prior testimony given in a preliminary hearing against a man
charged with forgery and possession of stolen credit cards.42 The
State subpoenaed the witness to appear at trial with no success.4 3
The State relied on an Ohio statute that excepted from its hearsay
rule preliminary examination testimony when a witness who, "for
any reason," could not appear at trial to argue that the former tes-
timony was admissible.44 The Supreme Court was asked to deter-
mine whether the use of the witness's prior testimony violated
Roberts's right to confront, at trial, witnesses who testified against
him.45 The Court held that the admission of the testimony did not
run afoul of the Constitution. 6
In so holding, the Court implicitly rejected the argument that the
Confrontation Clause protects wholly separate concerns from
39. See Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Profes-
sor Friedman, 86 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1045 (1998) (suggesting the Court's jurisprudence has not
been coherent); Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence
Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REV. 893, 943 n.152 (1992) (calling the Court's confrontation
jurisprudence "irrational").
40. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
41. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amend-
ment, 35 UCLA L. REv. 557, 558-59 (1988) (suggesting Roberts clarified the Court's Con-
frontation Clause analysis).
42. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 58 (1980). The witness was called by the defendant
at the preliminary hearing but contradicted the defendant's assertion that she had actually
given the defendant the allegedly stolen credit cards and the allegedly forged check. Id. In
spite of her denials, the defendant's attorney did not ask to have her declared a hostile
witness and did not request permission to cross-examine her. Id.
43. Id. at 59.
44. Id. (indicating that the Court had granted certiorari to consider whether admission
of the witness's transcript testimony at the preliminary hearing violated the respondent's
right of confrontation in light of the facts that the witness was absent at trial and had not
been cross-examined at the preliminary hearing).
45. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62.
46. See id. at 77 (stating that when a witness is not available at trial, the Confrontation
Clause requires a showing that the witness is unavailable and that the prior testimony of
the witness must be reliable, and concluding that the prior testimony of the witness was
reliable and that the prosecution had fulfilled its duty of a good faith effort to establish the
constitutional unavailability of the witness).
2003]
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those protected by the hearsay prohibition. Because the right to
confrontation, like the hearsay rule, protects an interest in ensuring
reliable evidence through rigorous cross-examination, the right
must operate to exclude some hearsay testimony.47 Although, in
some cases, the Court held that competing interests will weigh
against providing a face-to-face confrontation and in favor of ad-
mitting hearsay, those interests alone are not sufficient to override
the protections of the clause.48 Even when a hearsay exception is
grounded in such interests, the Government must demonstrate
both the reliability of the hearsay and the necessity of relying on
hearsay, instead of presenting live testimony.49
To ensure that the hearsay is reliable, the Court stated, the Gov-
ernment may demonstrate that it "falls within a firmly rooted hear-
say exception."5"' If it does, then courts may infer, without more,
that the evidence is reliable. 51 If it does not, the Government must
prove that "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" render
the hearsay admissible.52
If the Government proves the hearsay's reliability, it must then
demonstrate that the use of hearsay is necessary.53 Here, the Court
repeated the rule it had established just four years earlier in Barber
v. Page.54 That rule requires the Government to prove necessity by
showing that the witness is unavailable to testify. 55 To prove un-
availability, the Government must demonstrate that it made good
faith efforts to produce live testimony in a criminal proceeding.
56
The Government cannot be required to perform a futile act.57
However, "[I]f there is a possibility, albeit remote, that affirmative
47. Id. at 63.
48. Id. at 64.
49. Id. at 65; see also John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation,
Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
191, 204 (1999) (calling reliability and necessity "twin pillars" of admissibility).
50. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
51. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
52. Id.
53. See id. at 74 (indicating that in addition to showing the evidence is reliable, the
defense contended it also had to be necessary).
54. Id. at 74 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968)).
55. Id. at 74.
56. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74; see also Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25 (explaining that un-
availability is not satisfied absent a showing of good faith efforts to procure availability).
57. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74.
[Vol. 34:363
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measures might produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith
may demand their effectuation. "58
In a series of cases following Roberts, the Court backed away
from the clear analysis established in that case. Acknowledging
that "[i]n the course of rejecting the Confrontation Clause claim in
[Roberts], we used language that might suggest that the Confronta-
tion Clause generally requires that a declarant either be produced
at trial or be found unavailable before his out-of-court statement
may be admitted into evidence."59 The Court limited that require-
ment to the particular facts of Roberts-imposing it only when the
challenged hearsay is prior judicial testimony.6" The rule does not
apply, the Court has held, when the challenged hearsay evidence
has an "independent evidentiary significance of its own" and when
there would be little to be gained from enforcing the rule.6 Thus,
the Court has concluded that a coconspirator's out-of-court state-
ments are not subject to the rule of unavailability because they can
"'provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that cannot be repli-
cated, even if the declarant testifies to the same matters in
court."62 Under similar reasoning, the Court has also permitted
the use of the spontaneous declarations of a child-sexual-abuse vic-
tim made in the course of seeking medical treatment.63 Spontane-
ous declarations made "without the opportunity to reflect on the
consequences of one's exclamation-may justifiably carry more
58. Id. In the end, the Court held the inquiry will be one of reasonableness. Id.
(quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
59. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353 (1992).
60. See id. at 354 (relating to the introduction of transcript testimony from a probable
cause hearing); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986) (stating, "Roberts must be
read consistently with the question it answered, the authority it cited, and its own facts");
see generally John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-
Examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 206 (1999)
(describing the Court's "retreat" from Roberts's approach); Tom Patton, Sixth Amend-
ment's Confrontation Clause-Is a Showing of Unavailability Required?, 17 S. ILL. U. L.
573, 586-89 (1993) (outlining the Court's jettison from Roberts's approach); Barbara Rook
Snyder, Defining the Contours of Unavailability and Reliability for the Confrontation
Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REv. 189, 192 (1993) (noting the Court's move away from Roberts's
unavailability requirement).
61. See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394; see also White, 502 U.S. at 354.
62. White, 502 U.S. at 354 (quoting Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395). A statement made in
furtherance of a conspiracy, the Court held, is often significant precisely because it was
made during the existence of that conspiracy. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395.
63. See White, 502 U.S. at 356 (justifying admissibility absent the opportunity to re-
flect on consequences of declaration).
2003]
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL
weight with a trier of fact than a similar statement offered in the
relative calm of the courtroom. ' 64 As for statements made during
medical treatment, the Court found that because the "the declarant
knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreat-
ment," they carry "special guarantees of credibility that a trier of
fact may not think replicated by courtroom testimony. "65 The
Court has also declared constitutional a statute permitting the testi-
mony of a child-sex-abuse victim to be offered through closed-cir-
cuit television, even though the child is available to testify.66
Additionally, the Court held that the State could show necessity
not by proving that the witness was unavailable, but by making a
case-by-case demonstration that testifying at trial would cause
trauma to the child witness. 67
Although the Court has abandoned Roberts's unavailability re-
quirement for many types of hearsay, the requirement remains in-
tact in instances which the prosecution attempts to introduce prior,
out-of-court testimony.68 This is so because prior judicial testi-
mony seldom has independent evidentiary value.69  To the con-
trary, the Court has continued to recognize that with such
evidence, in-court testimony is stronger than the challenged hear-
say: "If the declarant is available and the same information can be
presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with full
cross-examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor of
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990).
67. Id.; see also White, 502 U.S. at 354-56 (stating that out-of-court statements made
by child victims are not subject to Roberts's unavailability requirement).
68. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 393-94 (1986). Justices Thomas and Scalia
have suggested that the clause applies only to witnesses who are actually present at trial or
who offer "testimony" prior to trial:
The federal constitutional right of confrontation extends to any witness who actually
testifies at trial, but the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements
only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affida-
vits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. It was this discrete category of testi-
monial materials that was historically abused by prosecutors as a means of depriving
criminal defendants of the benefit of the adversary process.
White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation
Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 86 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1045 (1998)
(arguing that the Confrontation Clause applies to any witness who testifies "either by tak-
ing the stand in person or via government-prepared affidavits, depositions, videotapes, and
the like").
69. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394.
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the declarant, there is little justification for relying on the weaker
version. ' 70  Because live testimony is the stronger evidence, the
Constitution prohibits reliance on former testimony, unless the
Government demonstrates that the witness is actually unavailable
to testify.71
A similar requirement is imposed by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.72 In 1974, two years after the Court reaffirmed Barber's un-
availability requirement in Roberts, the Court recommended an
amendment to the rules requiring proponents of prior testimony to
demonstrate that they had tried, through "process or other reason-
able means," to secure live testimony.73 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has explicitly stated that the unavailability requirement in the
Rule and that embodied in the Confrontation Clause are not
coextensive.74
III. TRANSPORTING PROSECUTIONS AND § 1324(d)-
CONGRESS IDENTIFIES A PROBLEM, BUT FAILS
TO PROVIDE A SOLUTION
Because the requirements of the hearsay rule and the Constitu-
tion are not the same, it is difficult to see the potential effect of
Congress's provision authorizing the admission of videotaped dep-
ositions of deported witnesses pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324.75
Clearly, Congress was attempting to reach the unavailability re-
quirement-it authorized the admission of the hearsay
"[n]otwithstanding any provision of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence ''76 to eliminate the need to detain deportable aliens indefi-
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. FED. R. EVID. 804 (defining unavailability in five ways). A declarant is unavaila-
ble if (1) his testimony is privileged; (2) he refuses to testify; (3) he cannot remember his
prior statement; (4) he is dead or very ill; or (5) the proponent of the witness's testimony
cannot "procure the declarant's attendance ... by process or other reasonable means." Id.
73. FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee's note; see also FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
74. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 393 n.5; see also United States v. Martinez-Perez, 916 F.2d 1020,
1024 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding defendant was not required to cite Rule 15 or Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(a) when raising a Confrontation Clause challenge); 2 MCCORMICK ON Evi-
DENCE § 252 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (noting that Barber's unavailability re-
quirement seems more stringent than the hearsay exception embodied in rule).
75. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(d) (2002).
76. See id. (mentioning only Federal Rules of Evidence); United States v. Santos-Pi-
non, 146 F.3d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that Congress said nothing about constitu-
tional requirements in 8 U.S.C. § 1324(d)).
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nitely pending trial." Congress indicated its intent to make
deposition testimony easier to admit under the rules of evidence,
however, it said nothing about the requirements of the Constitu-
tion.78 The failure to do so is likely an acknowledgement that Con-
gress cannot abrogate constitutional obligations.
The few courts to confront the statute's constitutionality have
recognized this impediment, noting that the provision cannot reach
the constitutional duty to prove unavailability.79 They have not ar-
ticulated what role, if any, the law can play in § 1324 prosecutions.
The courts thus leave the constitutional unavailability requirement
intact, but they fail to resolve the conflict regarding the parameters
of that requirement in transporting cases.
A. The Problem
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1324 makes it a crime to bring aliens into the
United States or to harbor them there.80 In the usual case, to
prove a defendant guilty of that offense, the Government offers the
testimony of agents involved in the arrest and the testimony of the
aliens who were allegedly brought in or harbored. 81 The witnesses
are chosen almost immediately after the defendant's arrest; the
Government then interviews all the aliens to determine which of
them have evidence that either inculpates or exculpates the defen-
dant.82 Those aliens not selected to testify are returned to their
native countries; those aliens who will testify are detained.83
77. H.R. CONF. Rei . No. 104-828, at 206 (1996).
78. See id. (failing to address constitutional requirements).
79. See United States v. Aguilar-Tamayo, 300 F.3d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 2002) (recogniz-
ing that the requirements of the Confrontation Clause must be satisfied); United States v.
Santos-Pinon, 146 F.3d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the requirements of the Consti-
tution are not abrogated).
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2002).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 861 (1982) (noting that
the Government detained an alien to testify in an illegal transporting case); Torres-Ruiz v.
United States Dist. Court, 120 F.3d 933, 935-36 (9th Cir. 1997) (describing the selection and
detention of witnesses for a smuggling case); Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 414 (5th
Cir. 1992) (describing an instance of the practice).
82. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 861. Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
the Government is required to produce for the defendant any evidence that tends to excul-
pate him. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also Valenzuela-Bernal, 858 U.S. at 868 (outlining
standards for determining materiality).
83. See Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 861 (explaining the procedure); James F. Smith,
A Nation that Welcomes Immigrants? An Historical Examination of United States Immigra-
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How to deal with these testifying witnesses has been a continu-
ing and difficult problem. The Government has the legal authority
to keep the material witnesses in U.S. custody pending the defen-
dant's trial.84 Detention is authorized by the material witness stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, and by federal regulations that discourage
the deportation of alien material witnesses when their presence is
needed to testify on behalf of the United States. 85 In fact, the Gov-
ernment has relied on this authority to justify keeping alien wit-
nesses in custody so that they could testify in § 1324 proceedings.86
Although retaining witnesses is authorized by law, it causes lo-
gistical and human rights problems.87 The Supreme Court ad-
dressed some of the burdens imposed on the Government in
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,8 noting that in 1979, almost
one-half of the inmates incarcerated in the Southern District of
California were material witnesses who had not been charged with
a criminal offense. 9 Detaining such witnesses resulted in over-
crowding in federal facilities and imposed financial and physical
tion Policy, I U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227, 246 (1995), WL I UCDJILP 227 (noting
the Government's practice of detaining material witnesses).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2002). Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 and 3144 authorize keeping mate-
rial witnesses in custody when necessary. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2002). Congress did not
abrogate either of these provisions when it passed 8 U.S.C. § 1324(d), which provides for
the admissibility of videotaped testimony. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(d) (2002).
85. See 8 C.F.R. § 215.2(a) (2002) (prohibiting departure of aliens if deportation
would prejudice the interests of the United States); 8 C.F.R. § 215.3(g) (2002) (deeming
the departure of aliens who are witnesses to any pending criminal case as prejudicial).
86. Torres-Ruiz, 120 F.3d at 934-35; Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 413-14; see also In re
Class Action Application for Habeas Corpus ex rel. All Material Witnesses, 612 F. Supp.
940, 942-43 (W.D. Tex. 1985) (discussing claims of witnesses detained under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3144).
87. See Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 865 (describing difficulties in detaining wit-
nesses); United States v. Aguilar-Tamayo, 300 F.3d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 2002) (sympathizing
with difficulties of dealing with alien witnesses); United States v. Rivera, 859 F.2d 1204,
1207-08 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that the burden rests on the Government in detaining
witnesses).
88. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 860 (granting certiorari to decide whether the Gov-
ernment violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by deporting two alien witnesses).
89. Id. at 865.
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burdens on the Government. 9° In addition, detention conflicts
with the Government's goal of speedy removal of illegal aliens.91
These detentions also take a toll on the individuals being held.
Although these people are not accused of a crime, they are often
detained for up to several months in federal custody, awaiting the
defendant's trial, separated from their homes, their families, and
their livelihoods.92 Some of the witnesses have sought relief from
these hardships.93 These detainees argue that Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 15 and 18 U.S.C. § 3144 empower courts, upon
request, to preserve their testimony through deposition and release
them from custody.94 The courts have generally been sympathetic
to these contentions, agreeing that indefinitely holding persons not
charged with a crime is both unfair to the witnesses and burden-
some on the Government.95 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, affirming a district court's decision to order
alien witnesses deposed and released, stated the problem concisely:
If the court had denied the motion for depositions, these alien mate-
rial witnesses would have been incarcerated for more than three
90. Id.; see also United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1971)
(attributing the Government practice of interviewing witnesses and then returning them to
their countries to a "financial burden which would otherwise fall upon the Government"),
abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
91. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 864; see also Rivera, 859 F.2d at 1208 (restating the
Government's dual responsibility to enforce criminal laws and to comply with immigration
policies).
92. See Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 865 (noting twenty-day detentions); Torres-
Ruiz v. United States Dist. Court, 120 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that witnesses
had been detained for sixty days); Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d at 3 (noting the possibility
of detentions of up to six months); James F. Smith, A Nation That Welcomes Immigrants?
An Historical Examination of United States Immigration Policy, 1 U.C. DAVIS IN'L L. &
POL'v 227, 246 & n.109 (1995), WL 1UCDJILP 227 (noting custody can last "for weeks to
months").
93. See Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 412 (5th Cir. 1992) (describing suit
brought by detained witnesses); see also In re Class Action Application for Habeas Corpus
ex rel. All Material Witnesses, 612 F. Supp. at 943 (granting aliens' request for attorneys at
the hearing to determine whether they were entitled to release).
94. See Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 414 (describing witnesses' claims). Rule 15(a) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the taking of witnesses' depositions in
"exceptional circumstances," if doing so is in the interest of justice and requested by the
witness. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a). Title 18 U.S.C. § 3144 also authorizes a material witness
to request that he be released if his testimony "can adequately be secured by deposition,"
unless detention is necessary to prevent a "failure of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2002); see
also Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 419 (explaining the process for securing witnesses' release).
95. Rivera, 859 F.2d at 1207-08.
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months, even though they were neither indicted nor convicted of a
crime. The appellant was both indicted and convicted on nine
counts, and he spent less time incarcerated than did these witnesses,
who were deposed and deported.96
Although releasing the alien material witnesses clearly meant
that they would likely return to their native countries, causing po-
tential Confrontation Clause concerns, most of these cases did not
explicitly address those concerns. The cases dealt with requests by
witnesses that their depositions be taken and they be released, and
issues collateral to those requests.97 They did not deal with the ef-
fect those requests would have on the defendants' right to confront
those adverse witnesses at trial.98 The question whether the aliens
would ultimately appear at trial, or whether the Government
would be required to attempt to produce them, was not at issue.99
Those questions eventually presented themselves, however, as
district courts attempted to preempt the problems caused by de-
taining alien material witnesses in alien transporting cases. In re-
sponse to complaints about the difficulties and unfairness of
indefinitely detaining the witnesses, some district courts began issu-
ing "standing orders," directing that the depositions of material
witnesses be taken so that the witnesses could be released. 100
Those depositions were ordered, in some cases, whether the wit-
nesses requested them or not.' Once the depositions were taken,
96. Id. at 1207.
97. See, e.g., Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 418-19 (deciding whether the Government was
justified in resisting witnesses' request for release without finally deciding the constitu-
tional question); In re Class Action Application for Habeas Corpus ex rel. All Material
Witnesses, 612 F. Supp. at 942-43 (deciding whether attorneys should be provided for wit-
nesses seeking release). But see Rivera, 859 F.2d at 1207 (deciding the constitutional ques-
tion by holding that taking depositions does not violate the Confrontation Clause).
98. See, e.g., Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 418-19 (noting that the case involved only the
rights of the detained witnesses); In re Class Action Application for Habeas Corpus, ex. rel.
All Material Witnesses, 612 F. Supp. at 940 (recognizing that the only issues involved in the
case were related to the rights of the detained witness).
99. See Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 418-19 (identifying that only detained witnesses'
issues were before the court).
100. United States v. Allie, 978 F.2d 1401, 1403 (5th Cir. 1992); Aguilar-Ayala, 973
F.2d at 414; United States v. Lopez-Cervantes, 918 F.2d 111, 112 (10th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d 266, 268 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Guadian-
Salazar, 824 F.2d 344, 345-46 (5th Cir. 1987).
101. See United States v. Fuentes-Galindo, 929 F.2d 1507, 1509-10 (10th Cir. 1991)
(finding depositions improperly ordered where no showing of exceptional circumstances
was made); Lopez-Cervantes, 918 F.2d at 113 (noting that the witness had not requested
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the material witnesses were promptly released, which often meant
they were returned to their native countries."°2 In many cases, the
defendant's right to be confronted with those witnesses appeared
simply to have been forgotten. "The whole procedure," one court
noted, "assumed the witnesses would not appear at trial."' 10 3
As it became increasingly plain that under these orders, wit-
nesses would be sent out of the country before trial, § 1324 defend-
ants began to complain that deposing and releasing alien material
witnesses violated their confrontation rights. They contended that
the witnesses' prior testimony was subject to the unavailability rule
set forth in Roberts.0 4 Regardless of the need to depose material
witnesses, they argued, the Government could not be relieved of its
constitutional obligation to make good faith efforts to secure their
live testimony for trial.'0 5 Faced with these claims, the circuit
courts attempted to delineate the parameters of the Government's
confrontation obligations in cases in which material witnesses were
either in Government custody or had been deported to their native
depositions, and no party had filed an affidavit in support of depositions); Guadian-
Salazar, 824 F.2d at 347 (noting that depositions were ordered automatically and over the
objections of the Government). Whether the depositions were proper, aside from any
Confrontation Clause concerns, has turned largely on whether the order called for individ-
ualized showings of the need for taking depositions. Compare Allie, 978 F.2d at 1405 (ap-
proving an order that called for individualized showings), with Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d
at 347 (disapproving order where no exceptional circumstances were shown), and Lopez-
Cervantes, 918 F.2d at 113 (arguing the Government did not show exceptional
circumstances).
102. Lopez-Cervantes, 918 F.2d at 114; Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d at 346.
103. Lopez-Cervantes, 918 F.2d at 114.
104. See Brumley v. Wingard, 269 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2001) (appealing conviction
on the grounds that defendant's right to confrontation had been violated); Whelchel v.
Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1209 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the deposition violated the
Confrontation Clause because the defendant could not attend). But see John G. Douglass,
Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to
Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 228 n.189 (1999) (stating that former testi-
mony would only include ex parte depositions, not hearsay stemming from "quasi-judicial
settings").
105. The Confrontation Clause requires prosecutorial authorities to make a good faith
effort to obtain a witness's presence at trial. Allie, 978 F.2d at 1406; Lopez-Cervantes, 918
F.2d at 114; Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d at 269. Furthermore, in both Lopez-Cervantes and
Guadian-Salazar, the Government agreed with the defendant that the standing orders
were illegal, because the orders did not call for individualized showings of exceptional
circumstances justifying the taking of witness depositions. Lopez-Cervantes, 918 F.2d at
112; Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d at 347.
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countries and as a result were beyond the jurisdiction of the trial
court.
The task was not easy-guidance from the Supreme Court was
neither directly relevant nor consistent.1"6 Two Supreme Court
cases, Barber v. Page'1 7 and Mancusi v. Stubbs,' both appeals
from habeas proceedings, dealt with witnesses who were beyond
the jurisdiction of the trial court and not subject to witness subpoe-
nas.109 Neither case, however, addressed witnesses who left the
country at the Government's behest.110 To make matters more
confusing, the Court reached different results in the cases, with lit-
tle explanation for the variance. Barber seemed to suggest that the
mere inability to compel attendance was insufficient to satisfy the
Constitution; Mancusi seemed to suggest the opposite.111
In Barber, a material witness in an Oklahoma state murder trial,
whose testimony had been preserved by deposition, was in federal
custody in Texas, beyond Oklahoma's jurisdiction. 12 The State ar-
gued that because the witness was beyond Oklahoma's subpoena
jurisdiction, the witness was unavailable to testify and it should be
permitted to introduce his deposition testimony over the defen-
dant's Confrontation Clause objection.11 3 The Supreme Court dis-
agreed. It rejected the State's assumption that "the mere absence
of a witness from the jurisdiction was sufficient ground for dispens-
ing with confrontation on the theory that 'it is impossible to compel
106. See Allie, 978 F.2d at 1406 (stating that the effort required of Government
"eludes absolute resolution"); Susan W. Crump & Elaine Carlson, Fifth Circuit Survey:
June 1992/May 1993, Evidence, 25 TEX. TECH L. REV. 677, 687 (1994) (observing that the
definition of "good faith effort" is a "matter of some question").
107. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
108. 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
109. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 211 (1972) (stating that the witness in this
case was in Sweden); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 719 (1968) (involving a trial court in
Oklahoma and a witness in Texas).
110. See Barber, 390 U.S. at 719 (identifying that the witness in this case was in federal
prison in Texas); Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 211 (recognizing that the witness had become a
permanent resident of Sweden).
111. See Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 212-13 (finding no Confrontation Clause violation when
the witness voluntarily returned to Sweden); Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25 (finding violation
when the witness was in federal custody); see also Barbara Rook Snyder, Defining the
Contours of Unavailability and Reliability for the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV.
189, 199 (1993) (explaining that the Supreme Court appeared to weaken Barber's good-
faith effort requirement in Mancusi).
112. Barber, 390 U.S. at 720.
113. Id. at 722.
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his attendance, because the process of the trial Court is of no force
without the jurisdiction." 114 The Court pointed to increased coop-
eration among the states and between the states and the federal
government as evidence that such a global assumption was unwar-
ranted." 5 It also held that the mere fact that federal authorities
might refuse to produce the witness did not excuse Oklahoma from
asking. 1 6 Because the State had not done so or made any efforts
to bring the witness to trial, the Court concluded that the defen-
dant's constitutional right to confrontation had been violated. 17
Just four years later, the Supreme Court reached a different con-
clusion in a similar case."I In Mancusi, a material witness to a
murder voluntarily left the United States in the period between the
defendant's first trial for murder and his retrial some nine years
later.119 The State issued a subpoena for the witness in an attempt
to secure process at his last known U.S. address, but service
failed.120 The State then put the witness's son on the stand to tes-
tify that his father had voluntarily moved to Sweden.12 1 Over the
defendant's objection, the trial judge permitted the State to read
the witness's earlier testimony to the jury. 122
The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's Confrontation
Clause challenge. 23 It held that because the district court had no
authority to compel the witness to leave Sweden to testify, and be-
cause there were no avenues of cooperation between the United
States and Sweden, any effort to compel attendance would have
been unsuccessful.124 The Court declared, without much elabora-
tion, that the State had made a stronger showing of unavailability
than was shown in Barber and on that showing, "[A] federal
habeas court was not warranted in upsetting the determination of
the state trial court. '125
114. Id. at 723 (quoting 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1404 (3d ed. 1940)).
115. Id. at 723-24.
116. Id. at 724-25.
117. Barber, 390 U.S. at 725.
118. Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 212-13.




123. Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 212-13.
124. Id. at 212.
125. Id. at 212-13.
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Barber and Mancusi are difficult to distinguish.126 The most ob-
vious basis for doing so-that the former case involved jurisdic-
tions within the United States and the latter involved international
jurisdictions, is somewhat simplistic. A more likely distinction is
the Court's different perceptions about the viability of securing the
witnesses' attendance at trial. In Barber, the Court noted an in-
creasing openness between state and federal jurisdictions that may
have permitted some cooperation in getting the witness to the
Oklahoma trial. 121 The Mancusi Court, on the other hand, con-
cluded that no informal or formal channels existed to assist the
Government in bringing the witness from Sweden to the United
States. 28
Arguably, Mancusi's nearly per se conclusion that leaving the
country renders a witness unavailable to testify is untenable after
Roberts. In Roberts, the Court stated that whether the Govern-
ment had satisfied its Confrontation Clause obligations depended
on what efforts were reasonable.129 A test grounded in reasonable-
ness would seem to preclude global rules and instead to call for a
case-by-case analysis to determine whether the Government com-
plied with the Constitution.130  Cases decided by the Supreme
Court after it issued Roberts emphasize this need for a fact-specific
inquiry.
Nonetheless, some courts have relied explicitly on Mancusi or
have echoed its reasoning to limit the Government's duties in cases
where material witnesses have been deported.' They have held
that the Government has no obligation to secure the witness's pres-
ence once the witness has been deposed and deported. 3 2 Even
126. Id. at 223 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority distinguished Bar-
ber on "untenable grounds").
127. Barber, 390 U.S. at 723.
128. Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 212; see also Barbara Rook Snyder, Defining the Contours
of Unavailability and Reliability for the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 189, 199
(1993) (noting the distinction drawn by the Court between channels available between
states and the federal government and lack of channels available between nations).
129. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 161-62 (1970)).
130. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988) (stating that the Confrontation
Clause analysis requires a case-by-case examination); see also Maryland v. Craig, 457 U.S.
836, 855 (1990) (stating that the Confrontation Clause analysis is case specific).
131. United States v. Rivera, 859 F.2d 1204, 1207 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Terrazas-Montano, 747 F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 1984).
132. Rivera, 859 F.2d at 1207; Terrazas-Montano, 747 F.2d at 469.
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under Roberts, the Government was not required to perform a fu-
tile act, and, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit has stated, deportation to a country that will not assist in
compelling attendance renders futile any attempt to bring wit-
nesses to trial. 133
Other courts have rejected any per se conclusions about the
Government's obligations when a witness is out of the country. 134
They rely instead on Roberts's reasonableness requirement. 135
These courts have insisted that the Government must attempt to
bring the deported witnesses to trial, regardless of the need to re-
lease alien witness, even in cases where the witnesses' testimony
was preserved in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence. 36
For those courts, then, while a witness could seek his release by
asking that he be deposed, the Government could not depose him,
deport him, and then rely on the deportation to demonstrate that
the witness was unavailable to testify. 137
133. United States v. Perez-Sosa, 164 F.3d 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Terrazas-
Montano, 747 F.2d at 469).
134. See, e.g., Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1992) (suggesting
Government must comply with the Constitution before depositions may be admitted);
United States v. Fuentes-Galindo, 929 F.2d 1507, 1510 (10th Cir. 1991) (pointing out that
there was no showing of "exceptional circumstances" that warranted the taking of the ma-
terial witnesses' deposition); United States v. Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d 266, 269 (10th Cir.
1989) (holding that Government is required to show unavailability of witnesses); United
States v. Provencio, 554 F.2d 361, 363 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding plainly erroneous introduc-
tion of deposition testimony when the Government did not demonstrate unavailability);
see also United States v. Huang, 827 F. Supp. 945, 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that the
Government must demonstrate witness unavailability).
135. See United States v. Lopez-Cervantes, 918 F. 2d 111, 114 (10th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Martinez-Perez, 916 F.2d 1020, 1023 (5th Cir. 1990).
136. Lopez-Cervantes, 918 F.2d at 114; Martinez-Perez, 916 F.2d at 1024; Eufracio-
Torres, 890 F.2d at 269.
137. See Susan W. Crump & Elaine Carlson, Fifth Circuit Survey: June 1992/May
1993, Evidence, 25 TEX. TECH L. REv. 677, 686, 687 & n.70 (1994) (suggesting that the
Fifth Circuit's "good-faith" standard is more stringent than that articulated by the Supreme
Court in Roberts). That court has held that Government efforts which included issuing
subpoenas to the material witnesses, offering to compensate them for their travel expenses
and their time, and instructing them to appear at a port of entry on a given date were
insufficient. See United States v. Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1987).
Standing alone, Guadian-Salazar has questionable precedential value. The Court's deci-
sion in that case was partly based on the district court's failure to find "exceptional circum-
stances" warranting the taking of depositions. See id. at 347. The Government conceded
error in Guadian-Salazar, arguing that the district court's blanket standing order com-
pelled it to violate defendants' confrontation rights. Id. at 347. However, the court ac-
cepted the Government's concession only after a careful review of the record, and it has
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
B. The Solution
On September 30, 1996, Congress weighed in. That year, it en-
acted extensive amendments to the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA). Collectively referred to as the Illegal Immigration Re-
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), the
amendments mandated sweeping changes to current immigration
law. 138 Among these changes was the addition of subsection (d) to
8 U.S.C. § 1324. That subsection states:
Notwithstanding any provision of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
videotaped (or otherwise audiovisually preserved) deposition of a
witness to a violation of subsection (a) of this section who has been
deported or otherwise expelled from the United States, or is other-
wise unable to testify, may be admitted into evidence in an action
brought for that violation if the witness was available for cross exam-
ination and the deposition otherwise complies with the Federal Rules
of Evidence.1
39
Subsection (d) is not a masterpiece of drafting. On its face, it
appears to authorize the admission of videotaped testimony, so
long as the testimony was taken in a proceeding governed by the
Rules of Evidence, and the defendant was provided the opportu-
nity to cross-examine the witnesses.14 0 Because it explicitly autho-
rizes the admission of deposition testimony, the provision is an
innovation. No other law authorizes the admission of videotaped
depositions without requiring that the Government demonstrate
that the witness is unavailable to testify. As has been noted, Rule
15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the tak-
since reaffirmed Guadian-Salazar's suggestion that deportation was insufficient to show
witness unavailability. See Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 418 (noting the different approach
taken by the Fourth and Eighth circuits).
138. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). The amendments were particularly harsh for aliens
with criminal histories. Melinda Smith, Comment, Criminal Defense Attorneys and Non-
Citizen Clients: Understanding Immigrants, Basic Immigration Law, & How Recent
Changes in Those Laws May Affect Your Criminal Cases, 33 AKRON L. REV. 163, 196-97
(1999). More harsh reforms to immigration law were enacted in April of 1996 as part of
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); see also Daniel Kanstroom, Introduction, 28 HUM. RTS. 2 (2001),
WL 28-WTR Hum. Rts. 2 (referring to IIRIRA's and AEDPA's "strenuous attacks" on
noncitizens).
139. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(d) (2002).
140. Id.
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ing of depositions,'14 as does the material witness statute. 142 Those
provisions guarantee that if for some reason the Government can-
not secure a witness's presence for trial, the witness's testimony
will be preserved. But preserving testimony for trial is quite differ-
ent from admitting it without ever requiring the Government to
prove that the witness is, in fact, unavailable. 43
Given the ongoing litigation over the role of the Confrontation
Clause's unavailability requirement in § 1324 cases, and the differ-
ences among the circuit courts, it would seem that the unavailabil-
ity requirement is precisely what subsection (d) was aimed at
eliminating. 44 Congress's express intent in passing the subsection
was to make it easier to deport alien material witnesses. 145 By ex-
plicitly referring to the rules of evidence, Congress suggested that
some requirement in those rules required setting aside in order to
accomplish its goal. The logical impediment was the unavailability
requirement.
Of course, insofar as it may have sought to abrogate the eviden-
tiary unavailability requirement, Congress was authorized to do so.
While the rules of evidence are prescribed by the United States
Supreme Court, the Court's power to create such rules exists "only
141. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a) (recognizing the right to take depositions under cer-
tain circumstances).
142. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2002) (authorizing detention of material witnesses when
they are needed to testify for the United States).
143. See United States v. Drogoul, 1 F.3d 1546, 1554 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that
before hearsay is sought to be admitted, the deposition process simply seeks preservation
of testimony for possible use); Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 1992)
(stating that deposition testimony taken under 18 U.S.C. § 3144 would be admissible only if
its admission was permitted by the Confrontation Clause); Susan W. Crump & Elaine Carl-
son, Fifth Circuit Survey: June 1992/May 1993, Evidence, 25 TEX. TECH L. REV. 677, 687
(1994) (arguing admissibility of alien depositions is governed by the Confrontation Clause,
not by Rule 15, which governs only the taking of depositions). Thus, the practice of taking
alien witness depositions raises dual inquiries-whether the depositions should have been
taken in the first place and whether they are admissible. At least one court has implied
that advocates truly interested in asserting the right to confrontation should object at both
stages. See United States v. Santos-Pinon, 146 F.3d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that
defendant waived his complaint regarding Government's part in aliens' absence from trial
by not objecting to the aliens' release at the time their depositions were taken).
144. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(d) (2002) (authorizing admission of evidence "notwithstand-
ing" the Federal Rules of Evidence). Of course, the plain language of the rule would ap-
pear to prohibit the use of any evidentiary rule to block admission of the deposition. Id.
But see United States v. Aguilar-Tamayo, 300 F.3d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding that
§ 1324(d) did not abrogate Rule 804).
145. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-828, at 206 (1996).
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in the absence of a relevant Act of Congress."'14 6 Thus, Congress
"retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially
created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by
the Constitution."' 47 But the evidentiary rule and the rule of the
Constitution are not coextensive; the interests they protect are not
wholly congruent. 48 Congress may not reach the protections en-
shrined in the Constitution. 149 The Supreme Court is the final arbi-
ter of that document. 50  Thus, Congress cannot eliminate any
burdens imposed on the Government by the Confrontation Clause,
as interpreted by the Court. 51 A statute that purports to do so
would likely be unconstitutional. 52
The Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, the only two
courts to directly address the constitutionality of § 1324(d), have
avoided holding the provision unconstitutional by concluding that
the statute does not alleviate the Government of its obligation,
under Roberts, to demonstrate a witness's unavailability. 53 The
146. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000); Palermo v. United States,
360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 382 (1933).
147. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437 (citing Palermo, 360 U.S. at 345-48); see also FED. R.
EVID. 802 (excepting from the hearsay rule any hearsay authorized by an act of Congress).
148. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970); see also United States v. Inadi,
475 U.S. 387, 393 n.5 (1986) (suggesting that although rules of evidence and the Confronta-
tion Clause protect the same values, "the overlap is not complete"). There are good rea-
sons for maintaining the distinction. The hearsay rules apply both to civil and criminal
cases; as one commentator notes, "the stakes are somewhat higher in criminal cases," and
the Government and the defendant in such cases often have unequal resources. Barbara
Rook Snyder, Defining the Contours of Unavailability and Reliability for the Confrontation
Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 189, 195 (1993). The Framers likely recognized these facts in
drafting a clause providing for special, facially unqualified confrontation rights in criminal
cases. Id. at 195 n.44 (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 431
(1968)).
149. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (explaining Con-
gress's boundaries in interpretations of statutes).
150. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (stating it is "the province and duty
of the judicial department to fay what the law is").
151. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988) (stating that hearsay exceptions arise
when necessary to further public policy and if firmly rooted in jurisprudence).
152. See Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272 (expressing that "no act of Congress can
authorize a violation of the Constitution"); United States v. Santa Maria, 15 F.3d 879, 881-
82 (9th Cir. 1994) (announcing that no act of Congress can authorize a constitutional
violation).
153. United States v. Aguilar-Tamayo, 300 F.3d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 2002); United States
v. Santos-Pinon, 146 F.3d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Circuit also apparently
assumes the statute's constitutionality. See United States v. Perez-Sosa, 164 F.3d 1082,
1085 (8th Cir. 1998) (concluding the government could use deposition testimony because
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:363
Ninth Circuit, for example, noted that the provision "says nothing
about abrogating the constitutional requirement of establishing un-
availability. ' 154 Instead, the court noted, Congress merely refers to
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 155 Because Congress does not say
anything about the constitutional requirement, in that court's view,
§ 1324(d) can "easily be read to comport" with it.156 Unavailability
still must be demonstrated before deposition testimony may be ad-
mitted.1 57 The Fifth Circuit likewise has declined to "read the stat-
ute as eliminating the requirement that the government establish
the unavailability of a witness before the witness's deposition testi-
mony can be admitted at trial."' 158
These courts have obeyed one principle of statutory construc-
tion-they have avoided pronouncing a congressional act unconsti-
tutional. 159  But they have violated another principle-the
principle that a statute should not be construed so as to render its
the witness was deported). The Perez-Sosa court did not directly address the constitution-
ality of the provision. However, it cited Santos-Pinon for the proposition that, even after
the passage of § 1324(d), an unavailability showing is required. Id. It then concluded that,
because the witnesses had been deported to Mexico, and because Mexico would not "ex-
tradite an individual based on a material witness warrant," any attempt to bring the wit-
nesses to trial would have been futile. Id. The Eighth Circuit has traditionally set the bar
for demonstrating unavailability quite low; as a result, that court held that a mere showing
of deportation will satisfy the Government's burden. See United States v. Terrazas-
Montano, 747 F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 1984) (indicating that requiring the government to
show they were unable to procure a witness would be a useless act).
154. Santos-Pinon, 146 F.3d at 736.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. But see Torres-Ruiz v. United States Dist. Court, 120 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir.
1997) (per curiam) (concluding that § 1324(d) is part of a design to address detention of
material witnesses without mentioning requirements of the Confrontation Clause).
158. Aguilar-Tamayo, 300 F.3d at 565. The Fifth Circuit's reasoning is somewhat un-
clear. It does not believe that § 1324(d) abrogates or alters the requirements of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, and it appears to base its constitutional ruling on Rule 804's
requirement that the Government attempt to secure live testimony "by process or other
means." Id. The court does not explain why, given the plain language of the statute, Rule
804 or any other provision in the evidentiary rules still applies or what provisions in the
rules of evidence it believes Congress was attempting to abrogate in amending the statute.
See id. (explaining that Rule 804 requires procuring a witness by other reasonable means).
159. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237 (1998) (observing that
courts should construe statutes to avoid declaring them unconstitutional or even causing
doubt as to their constitutionality); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg.
& Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (stating that statutes are to be construed
so that they are consistent with the Constitution).
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language superfluous. 160 Neither court explained what role, under
its interpretation, the new provision is to play in transporting cases
if it does not alleviate the Government of its constitutional burden
to demonstrate unavailability. If the constitutional requirement
survives § 1324(d), as the courts hold, then the provision can fully
effectuate Congress's intent in only the narrowest of circumstances,
such as when the defendant inadvertently fails to raise a constitu-
tional objection.
Thus, under the interpretations of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits,
neither § 1324 defendants nor the Government have any more gui-
dance in determining how to deal with the competing rights and
interests of the defendants, the witnesses, and the Government in
these cases. Since the circuit courts differ on the scope of the con-
frontation obligation and because the Supreme Court has not satis-
factorily resolved the question whether a Confrontation Clause
violation has occurred, outcomes of suits will continue to depend
on the circuit in which the prosecution is brought. In the circuits
that follow the reasoning of Mancusi, the Government will satisfy
its burden merely by demonstrating that the defendant has been
deported and that the country to which he has been deported will
not honor a witness subpoena.'61 Other circuits, such as the Fifth,
will likely require a greater showing of necessity. 62  In other
words, nothing has changed.
The Government and defendants charged with § 1324 offenses
need clearer guidance as to their rights and obligations. The Gov-
ernment owes duties to both prosecute its cases within the confines
160. See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (suggesting that
courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that find the language superfluous).
161. See United States v. Rivera, 859 F.2d 1204, 1207 (4th Cir. 1988) (discussing Man-
cusi where the "unavailable" exception was satisfied because the witness was out of the
country and the witness could not be compelled to appear in court); United States v. Ter-
razas-Montano, 747 F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding that witnesses were unavailable
because they were out of the country and were beyond the reach of process of the court).
162. See Aguilar-Tamayo, 300 F.3d at 565-66 (requiring that an attempt to secure the
presence of a witness must be made in order to establish unavailability as a predicate for
the admission of depositions); see also United States v. Lopez-Cervantes, 918 F.2d 111, 114
(10th Cir. 1990) (ruling a standing order improper that did not require the Government to
show good faith efforts); United States v. Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir.
1989) (requiring the Government to demonstrate a good faith effort to bring witnesses to
trial).
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of the Constitution and to promptly deport aliens.163 Detaining
alien witnesses for trial may help it meet the former obligation, but
it stymies the latter.164  Section 1324(d) defendants, on the other
hand, face unique difficulties. The Government generally has al-
most exclusive control over the evidence that will be presented at
their trials.1 65  The Government interviews the alien witnesses
before an attorney is even appointed to represent the defendant.1
66
The Government then selects the witnesses from which it will take
testimony to make its case. 67 Assuming no witness has clearly ex-
culpatory testimony, the remaining aliens are sent back to their na-
tive country, and any helpful information they might have to offer
is lost to the defendant. 168
In such circumstances, the defendant who wishes to contest his
guilt must do so by challenging the testimony of the alien witnesses
who have been handpicked by the Government. That testimony
may be ripe for a challenge-certainly, there could, in some cases,
be a basis for claiming that witnesses were coerced, or felt intimi-
dated and were testifying out of fear. Also there may be a basis for
arguing that these witnesses are testifying in order to deflect their
own culpability in the offense.169 If the defendant elects to mount
such a defense, he will likely want the jury to observe the de-
meanor of the witnesses as they testify face-to-face with him. 7 °
163. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 863-64 (1982) (recognizing
the dual obligations to prosecute the accused and quickly deport aliens).
164. See id. at 864 (noting that dual obligations can impose conflicting requirements);
see also Rivera, 859 F.2d at 1207 (acknowledging the dual responsibility to consider the
rights of the witness while upholding the duty to deport aliens without undue delay).
165. See Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 861 (reporting that the prosecution deported
two of the passengers after determining they had no material evidence).
166. See id. (indicating that the passengers were interviewed following arrest).
167. See id. (deporting two passengers, but retaining Romero-Morales because he
could provide a nonhearsay basis).
168. See id. at 872-73 (indicating that defendants may object to the deportation, under
the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause, only if they can demonstrate that
interviewing the witness would have assisted them in their defense or that the Government
did not act in good faith).
169. Cf Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1205 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
the Confrontation Clause was violated when codefendants' taped testimony was admitted,
in part because codefendants had motive to minimize their own involvement).
170. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) (stating that assessment of demeanor
assists in truth-finding); Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasiz-
ing that live cross-examination helps jury assess strengths or weakness of testimony).
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IV. SECTION 1324(d) CANNOT ANSWER QUESTIONS RAISED BY
THE CONSTITUTION; THE COURTS MUST ADDRESS THE
GOVERNMENT'S CONFRONTATION OBLIGATIONS
IN TRANSPORTING CASES
The tension between the rights of § 1324 defendants and the
needs of alien witnesses and the Government should be resolved
through judicial clarification of the Government's obligations
under the Confrontation Clause in transporting cases. The courts
should first resolve whether § 1324(d) can be construed to avoid a
finding that it is unconstitutional, while at the same time giving
meaningful effect to its language. In the likely event that such a
construction is impossible, the courts should hew to Roberts's con-
stitutional requirement of unavailability in § 1324 prosecutions.
A. Can Subsection (d) Be Construed in Harmony with the
Constitution?
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits declared § 1324(d) constitutional,
but did not articulate how the provision might function in a trans-
porting prosecution. 7' Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a plausible
way to give the provision its intended effect without violating the
Constitution. Two of the more plausible constructions raise more
problems than they resolve.
For example, the courts might have construed § 1324(d) to elimi-
nate from the Federal Rules of Evidence the requirement that the
hearsay proponent use "other reasonable means," aside from pro-
cess, to secure a witness's presence. 17 2 Limiting the requisite ef-
forts to the serving of subpoenas would validate the view of courts
holding that if a witness in another country cannot be compelled to
testify, then any efforts to bring him back for trial would be fu-
tile.' 7 3 But such a construction would likely not solve the subsec-
171. See United States v. Aguilar-Tamayo, 300 F.3d 562, 565 (2000) (holding § 1324(d)
constitutional because the procedures established in the statute comport with constitu-
tional confrontation rights); United States v. Santos-Pinon, 146 F.3d 734, 736 (9th Cir.
1998) (finding that the statute does not abrogate the constitutional requirement of estab-
lishing unavailability).
172. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5) (providing a hearsay exception when the proponent
of a statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance or testimony by pro-
cess or other reasonable means).
173. See United States v. Perez-Sosa, 164 F.3d 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that
"it would have been futile to require the government to show it could not procure the
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tion's constitutional difficulties. According to the Court in Roberts,
the Constitution requires that the Government take "reasonable"
steps to secure live testimony.1 74 Even if Congress eliminated the
"reasonableness" requirement from the evidentiary rule, the rea-
sonableness requirement of Roberts would remain, and § 1324(d)
would, again, have little effect.
Another possible construction-that Congress intended to de-
clare, as a general matter, that deportation always renders a wit-
ness unavailable, or renders attempts to bring that witness to trial
futile as a matter of law-raises the same constitutional problem.
Subsection (d) does appear to define as "unavailable" any witness
as a person who has been deported or expelled, whether or not the
Government has made any efforts to secure the witness's live testi-
mony.175 But, unless the Supreme Court has endorsed such a con-
flation, it likely cannot be presumed by Congress. 176 In fact, the
Supreme Court has rejected a very similar presumption in Coy v.
Iowa. 1
77
In Coy, the Court considered an Iowa statute that authorized the
admission of the hearsay statements of child-sex-abuse victims. 78
The statute presumed that these victims would suffer trauma as a
result of testifying. 179 Before the Supreme Court, Iowa argued that
this presumed trauma established the required necessity for using
hearsay rather than live testimony.1 80  The Supreme Court dis-
witness's attendance"); United States v. Rivera, 859 F.2d 1204, 1207 (4th Cir. 1988) (al-
lowing the issuing of a subpoena to a witness out of the country and beyond the compul-
sory process of the court to satisfy the good faith effort requirement under the
"unavailable" exception to the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Terrazas-Montano,
747 F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating that to require the government to show it was
unable to procure the attendance of a witness would be a useless act).
174. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980) (declaring that under the good faith
obligation to procure a witness, the lengths to which "the prosecution must go ...is a
question of reasonableness").
175. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(d) (2002) (referring to witnesses who have been deported or
are "otherwise" unavailable).
176. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (discussing the standard used in
allowing an exception to a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him); Coy v.
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988) (refusing to recognize Iowa's statutory exception since
that exception is not firmly rooted in jurisprudence).






agreed. 181 Meeting the requirements of the Confrontation Clause
means more than adhering to its "literal application." 182  Excep-
tions even to the "normal implications" of the Confrontation
Clause are impermissible unless they are based on particularized
findings.1 83  The unavailability requirement for prior testimony
would appear to be a "normal implication" of the constitutional
mandate. A finding of unavailability, therefore, must be made by
the trial judge, on the basis of a particular case's facts, not by the
legislature, as a general matter.18 4
A general finding of unavailability would also belie the facts and
circumstances surrounding § 1324 prosecutions.185 The Govern-
ment has demonstrated in a number of cases that it is able to at
least attempt to secure live testimony in these cases. 8 6 Federal
regulations encourage the Government to do S0.187 And the Gov-
ernment need not rely on detention in its attempts. In some in-
stances, material witnesses can be kept in the United States with
temporary work release permits. 88 If the aliens are not eligible for
work release, or if they wish to return to their native countries, the
181. Id.
182. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021.
183. Id.
184. See United States v. Lopez-Cervantes, 918 F.2d 111, 113 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating
that there should be particularized showing of unavailability before depositions can be
admitted).
185. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1968) (rejecting a claim of unavailability in
part because methods had been developed to assist in securing a witness's presence).
186. See United States v. Allie, 978 F.2d 1401, 1407 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
Government asked witnesses to return, told them to whom to report, contacted them
before the trial, and offered to compensate them for expenses); United States v. Eufracio-
Torres, 890 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1989) (explaining that the Government served process,
asked witnesses to return, told them how to do so, and offered compensation for their
testimony); United States v. Huang, 827 F. Supp. 945, 949-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that
the Government wrote to each witness and offered to pay for travel expenses).
187. See 8 C.F.R. § 215.2(a) (1987) (stating no alien shall be deported if departure is
deemed prejudicial to the United States); 8 C.F.R. § 215.3(g) (1987) (stating that the de-
portation of any alien needed to present testimony for United States is deemed prejudi-
cial); see also United States v. Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d 344, 347-48 (5th Cir. 1987)
(discussing regulations that apparently require alien witnesses to remain in the United
States).
188. See Allie, 978 F.2d at 1403 (reporting that the Government offered aliens the
option of staying in the United States with work permits); see generally Thomas Bak, Pre-
trial Detentions in the Ninth Circuit, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 993, 1020-22 (1998) (discussing
the Central District of California's efforts-including issuing work permits-to work with
pretrial services and the INS to ensure material witnesses are not detained but still appear
to testify at trial).
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Government can make, and has made, efforts to bring them
back. 189 The fact that a country will not honor a subpoena purport-
ing to compel their return does not make voluntary attendance im-
possible, or even unlikely.190 The Government can ask the
witnesses to return to testify, can remain in contact with the wit-
nesses after they have departed, can offer to compensate the wit-
nesses for traveling to testify, and can guarantee the witnesses
lawful passage into the United States for that purpose. 191 The law
not only contemplates that the Government will make such efforts,
it encourages it to do so by expressing a preference for measures
that bring material witnesses to trial.' 92 In light of this law, and the
good faith efforts the Government has been willing to make in
prior cases, it would be incongruous, to say the least, to declare
that deportation renders all witnesses unavailable, as a matter of
law, to attend trial.193
B. The Supreme Court Should Hold the Government to Its
Obligation to Demonstrate, On a Case-by-Case Basis,
Unavailability in Transporting Cases
If, as seems likely, the courts are unable to arrive at a meaningful
construction of subsection (d), the Supreme Court should review
the provision to determine whether Congress may, consistent with
the Constitution, do what it apparently sought to do in amending
the statute-abrogate the unavailability requirement enunciated in
Roberts. Although the Court has already subjected prior testimony
to a constitutional analysis in Ohio v. Roberts,'94 it may conclude
189. See Allie, 978 F.2d at 1407 (describing the Government's efforts to bring wit-
nesses to trial); Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d at 270 (discussing the obligation of government
to assure the appearance of a witness).
190. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 718, 724 (1968) (stating that absence of compulsory
process does not mean there are not other ways of brining witness to trial); United States v.
Aguilar-Tamayo, 300 F.3d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that even though Mexico would
not honor material witness extradition, the Government should make some attempt to
bring witnesses to trial).
191. Allie, 978 F.2d at 1207; Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d at 270.
192. See 28 U.S.C. § 3144 (2002) (discussing detention or release of witnesses); 8
C.F.R. § 215.2(a) (1987) (stating that no alien should depart or even attempt to, if such
departure would be prejudicial to the United States under this section); 8 C.F.R. § 215.3(g)
(1987) (deeming it prejudicial to deport an alien whose testimony is needed).
193. See Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that the
Government is "uniquely capable" of taking reasonable steps to bring witnesses to trial).
194. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-66 (1980).
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that for policy reasons, the prior testimony of deported aliens re-
quires independent evaluation.195 But that analysis should not lead
to a conclusion that the Government may depose material wit-
nesses and then rely on their hearsay statements to convict § 1324
defendants without first demonstrating unavailability.' 96
In other contexts, the Court has relieved the Government of its
Confrontation Clause obligation to prove unavailability on the ba-
sis of two findings; the kind of hearsay at issue has particular value
by virtue of its hearsay nature and there is little to be gained by
retaining the unavailability requirement.' 97 Neither basis exists in
cases involving the prior testimony of alien witnesses. The state-
ments made by aliens within days after their arrest for entering the
United States do not gain value by virtue of their hearsay nature.
To the contrary, the reliability of such statements is questionable.
The statements are made by individuals who may be afraid of de-
tention, criminal prosecution, and imprisonment and who may
have motive for shifting the blame for their own misconduct.
For this reason, there is often much to be gained from asking
these witnesses to tell their stories directly to the factfinder in the
presence of the defendant. Videotaped testimony is rarely an ade-
quate substitute for live testimony. 98 Prior testimony may be
taken with all the protections afforded by the Constitution and the
rules of evidence. Cross-examination may be thorough. And still,
courts recognize that live testimony before the trier of fact is the
better evidence.' 99 This is so because, as the Supreme Court has
stated, it is more difficult to lie against someone who is in the same
195. See id. at 64 (holding that policy interests "may warrant dispensing with confron-
tation at trial").
196. Cf Allie, 978 F.2d at 1408 (stating that because confrontation right is so impor-
tant, the Government must make more than perfunctory efforts to bring witnesses to trial).
197. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986) (identifying reasons why
principles used to obtain better evidence do not apply to coconspirator statements); see
also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354-58 (1992) (discussing reasons for relieving the Gov-
ernment of its burden to show unavailability).
198. See Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 419 (stating, "[E]ven the advanced technology of
our day cannot breathe life into a two-dimensional broadcast").
199. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-20 (1988) (explaining reasons why face-to-
face testimony is better evidence); Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 419 (opining the need for the
defendant to confront the witness in the court room because, "Only through live cross-
examination can the jury fully appreciate the strength or weakness of the witness'
testimony").
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room with you.200 And it is easier for a factfinder to assess a wit-
ness's demeanor in person, without the mitigating presence of a
camera.2 0 1 A jury can watch the interplay between witness and ac-
cused when the witness testifies live in the courtroom; if the testi-
mony is videotaped, the jury will see only the portions of the
proceedings that the cameraperson chooses to record.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
stated, "[T]rial by deposition steps hard on the right of the criminal
defendants to confront their accusers. '20 2 This is especially so in
§ 1324 prosecutions. Unlike the case of a voluntary departure from
the country, such as that presented in Mancusi, in these cases it is
the Government that is responsible for the witnesses' absence.20 3
The Government builds its case and returns most of the witnesses
to the alleged crime to their own countries. The unavailability rule
can prevent the Government from pursuing "a calculated strategy
of building a case by creating hearsay testimony. 20 4 Further, the
unavailability rule helps ensure that Government's testimony will
be responsive to the case as it develops at trial.20 5 New issues, or
200. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019; see also Barbara Rook Snyder, Defining the Contours of
Unavailability and Reliability for the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 189, 194
(1993) (contending that if the core of the confrontation guarantee includes opportunity to
observe demeanor, the right should be disposed of only on a showing of necessity). But see
John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination,
and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 191, 258-59 (1999) (arguing
that importance of demeanor is overestimated, and juries are unlikely to be capable of
discerning lies, even with live testimony).
201. See Aguilar-Ayala, 973 F.2d at 419 (discussing how videotaped deposition is only
a substitute to live testimony).
202. Id.
203. See United States v. Allie, 978 F.2d 1401, 1407 (5th Cir. 1992) (asserting that part
of the Government's good faith efforts should include trying to keep aliens in the United
States).
204. John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Ex-
amination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 228-29 (1999);
see also United States v. Motes, 178 U.S. 458, 472 (1900) (mentioning how the Constitution
does not shield an accused person from the consequences of his own faults); United States
v. Seijo, 595 F.2d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that under Federal Rule of Evidence 804,
absence of witnesses should not be due to "procurement or wrongdoing of the Govern-
ment"). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has rejected outright a
claim that the Government rendered deported witnesses unavailable, concluding that the
witnesses' choice to leave rather than face deportation proceedings rendered their depar-
ture voluntary. United States v. Rivera, 859 F.2d 1204, 1207 (4th Cir. 1988).
205. See United States v. Huang, 827 F. Supp. 945, 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (warning how
videotaped testimony may rebut in-court testimony).
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defenses, may arise long after the witnesses have left the country.
Having the witnesses present to respond to matters that arise at
trial benefits both the Government and the defendant.
The courts should reject relaxing the requirement set forth in
Roberts even though Congress has plenary power over matters re-
lating to immigration.2 °6 A transporting prosecution is criminal in
nature; the defendant faces incarceration in a federal prison.20 7
Under the Constitution, even illegal aliens are "persons" and are
thus entitled to the protections of due process and a fair trial.20 s
Among those protections is the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that
a defendant will be able to confront, face-to-face, his accusers.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court should decide against a
per se declaration that a mere showing of deportation is sufficient
to show unavailability and instead continue to require a case-by-
case consideration of the reasonableness of the Government's ef-
forts.20 9 Although in many cases, release, which might include de-
portation, may be the best way to meet both the Government's and
the witnesses needs, it nonetheless intrudes on the defendant's con-
stitutional rights. It is reasonable, under such circumstances, to re-
quire that the Government make every possible attempt to either
keep the witnesses in the country without unnecessarily burden-
some detention, or to attempt to ensure that the witnesses return
to testify. 210 Attempts will not always be successful. But, as Barber
206. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 864 (1980) (noting Con-
gress's "plenary power" over regulating admission of aliens).
207. See Barbara Rook Snyder, Defining the Contours of Unavailability and Reliability
for the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 189, 200 (1993) (arguing that when defen-
dant's "liberty [is] at stake," the Government should make all good faith efforts to secure
presence of witnesses).
208. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); In re Class Action Application for
Habeas Corpus ex rel. All Material Witnesses, 612 F. Supp. 940, 944 (W.D. Tex. 1985).
209. See Barbara Rook Snyder, Defining the Contours of Unavailability and Reliability
for the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 189, 192 (1993) (asserting that broad
definition of unavailability would be insufficient protection of confrontation rights). Hold-
ing the Government to its duty under Roberts will not require Herculean efforts from the
Government and will not lead to large numbers of reversals on "technicalities." The Fifth
Circuit demands that the Government make good faith efforts to obtain witnesses' pres-
ence, and the Government in that circuit has demonstrated its willingness and ability to do
so. United States v. Allie, 978 F.2d 1401, 1406-07 (5th Cir. 1992). See also United States v.
Aguilar-Tamayo, 300 F.3d 562, 565 (5th Cir. 2002) (disapproving of the Government's fail-
ure to make any effort).
210. Susan W. Crump & Elaine Carlson, Fifth Circuit Survey: June 1992/May 1993,
Evidence, 25 TEX. TECH L. REV. 677, 687 (1994) (arguing that a heightened standard
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holds, the possibility of failure should not prevent good faith
efforts.2 u
C. With Guidance from the Courts, Congress Can Draft a Better
Law
While Congress cannot abrogate the requirements of the Consti-
tution, it can, and should, draft legislation making it easier for the
Government to comply with those requirements. For example,
Congress should mandate that when possible, trials requiring the
use of alien witnesses be expedited so that any witness choosing to
stay and give testimony is not kept in the country for an unnecessa-
rily long period of time. It should also expand the Government's
options for detaining witnesses who can be persuaded to stay, so
that work release permits, Or other nonpunitive means of deten-
tion, can be relied upon to keep the witnesses in the United States
for the brief period leading up to the defendant's trial.212
Finally, Congress should authorize the Government to take mea-
sures to bring witnesses who choose to leave the United States
back. Congress should, for example, outline what steps the Gov-
ernment must take in such cases. It should also require that the
Government prove, in each § 1324 prosecution, that it took these
steps. In the end, the Government's efforts would necessarily be
subject to Roberts's reasonableness requirement, but a clear statu-
tory pronouncement would provide uniform guidance for courts
and litigants involved in § 1324 prosecutions as they seek to assess
what is reasonable under the facts of any given case.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 1324 functions at the nexus between the Government's
power to prosecute criminal offenses and its right to control who
will enter its borders. Cases prosecuted under the statute therefore
present special challenges for the Government and for the defend-
should be applied when the alternative to an unavailability showing is the detention of
witnesses).
211. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968); see also Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973
F.2d 411, 418 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating, "[T]he ultimate success or failure of those efforts is
not dispositive").
212. See Allie, 978 F.2d at 1407 (stating that the Government should make efforts to
keep witnesses in country rather than release them to their native countries).
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ants. The Government should answer to its duty to bring constitu-
tional prosecutions and its duty to promptly deport individuals who
are not legally authorized to be in the country. Defendants are
required to defend themselves in cases in which most witnesses to
the alleged crime have been removed from the country, well be-
yond their reach.
These difficulties, however, do not justify reducing § 1324 prose-
cutions to administrative proceedings. The result of a successful
§ 1324 prosecution is not deportation; it is imprisonment in a fed-
eral facility. For that reason, in spite of the complexities inherent
in § 1324 cases, the Government should not be relieved of its con-
stitutional obligations. The Supreme Court should clarify that
among those obligations is the duty to make good faith efforts to
present adverse witnesses at trial. Congress should make it easier
for the Government to make those efforts and to be successful in
making them, without unduly burdening the witnesses whose testi-
mony it seeks.
2003]
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:363
